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Where to Start Your PQC Inventory: A Decision GuideCryptography & Encryption
5 min readFor DIB Contractors

Where to Start Your PQC Inventory: A Decision Guide

The Decision You Face

Most organizations haven't fully mapped their cryptographic assets, making it unclear where to begin with post-quantum cryptography (PQC). If this sounds like your team, you're not alone. However, making the wrong initial move can waste a budget cycle. The real question isn't which PQC algorithm to choose, but rather how to scope and conduct your first cryptographic inventory effectively. A mismatched method will result in an unreliable spreadsheet.

This guide offers three paths, each based on specific compliance obligations or environmental conditions you can evaluate today.

Key Factors Affecting Your Choice

Answer these four questions before selecting a path:

  1. Do you have a defined Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) boundary? If you handle CUI under DFARS 252.204-7012, you're already obligated under NIST SP 800-171, and your assessment scope is documented. This boundary is your natural starting point.

  2. Do you have a current system inventory you trust? Control 3.4.1 in NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 requires baseline configurations and inventories of organizational systems. NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 includes similar requirements in CM-8 (System Component Inventory). A cryptographic inventory is only as good as the asset inventory it builds on.

  3. Do you operate cloud services or other systems under an authorization? Authorized environments like FedRAMP systems or Risk Management Framework packages already document cryptographic use in control implementation statements.

  4. How much of your cryptography do you actually control? Embedded libraries, vendor appliances, and inherited services mean some cryptographic use is invisible to your team.

Two compliance anchors apply regardless of path. SC-13 (Cryptographic Protection) in NIST SP 800-53 and requirement 3.13.11 in NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 both require cryptography used to protect CUI confidentiality to be FIPS-validated. Your inventory should record not just algorithm and key length, but also whether each module is validated under the Cryptographic Module Validation Program. SC-12 (Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management) and SC-17 (Public Key Infrastructure Certificates) guide you toward key lifecycle and X.509 Certificate records you should already track.

FIPS 140-2 validated modules are what assessors expect today. Your inventory must meet this requirement while also addressing future migration needs.

Path A: Start from Your CUI Boundary

Choose this path if: You're a DIB contractor with a documented System Security Plan, a defined CUI scope, and a CMMC assessment ahead under 32 CFR Part 170.

Why it fits: Your boundary is already established, assessors care about it, and the cryptographic requirements within it (3.13.8, 3.13.11, 3.13.16 on data in transit and at rest) are already assessed. You're extending existing work instead of starting anew.

How to run it:

  1. Pull your System Security Plan and network diagrams. List every in-scope asset category.
  2. Record where cryptography is used: TLS endpoints, VPN concentrators, disk and database encryption, email gateways, code signing, Public Key Infrastructure components, and remote access tools.
  3. Capture algorithm, key size, module, validation status, owner, and the data it protects.
  4. Flag anything that protects CUI with long confidentiality requirements. Data needing long-term protection is a strong candidate for early migration planning.

Watch for: Scope creep. Resist the urge to inventory the entire enterprise on the first pass. A scoped, defensible inventory beats a sprawling one.

Path B: Start from Your Authorized Systems and Inherited Controls

Choose this path if: You operate under the Risk Management Framework, maintain cloud offerings with a FedRAMP or DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide authorization, or depend heavily on a Common Control Provider.

Why it fits: Your control implementation statements for SC-12, SC-13, and related controls already describe cryptographic use. Your Customer Responsibility Matrix and Shared Responsibility Model show which party owns which cryptographic function. Continuous Authorization activity provides a natural cadence for keeping the inventory current.

How to run it:

  1. Extract cryptographic statements from your authorization packages and reconcile them against what's actually deployed.
  2. Use the Customer Responsibility Matrix to separate what you own from what your provider owns. For inherited cryptography, request provider documentation instead of assuming coverage.
  3. Add cryptographic inventory fields to your existing component inventory (CM-8) so it's maintained in one place, not two.

Watch for: Documentation drift. Implementation statements often describe intent, not current state. Verify with discovery tools or configuration review.

Path C: Start with Discovery Tooling and a Supply Chain Sweep

Choose this path if: You can't confidently answer the four factor questions above. Your asset inventory is outdated, cryptography is buried in applications and vendor products, or you've grown through acquisition.

Why it fits: Paths A and B assume a reliable record to build from. If you don't have one, documentation-first approaches will inherit its errors. Here you discover first, then reconcile.

How to run it:

  1. Scan network traffic and endpoints to identify protocols, certificates, and cipher suites in use.
  2. Review source code and build pipelines for cryptographic library calls. A Software Bill of Materials, where available, helps surface embedded libraries you didn't know you shipped.
  3. Query suppliers about cryptographic modules and their roadmap. Flow-Down Requirements under DFARS 252.204-7012 already push security obligations down your supply chain; use that relationship to ask for cryptographic disclosure.
  4. Normalize findings into a single register and assign an owner to every entry.

Watch for: Tool output treated as truth. Discovery tools produce false positives and miss encrypted or proprietary channels. Validate a sample manually.

Summary Matrix

Factor Path A: CUI Boundary Path B: Authorized Systems Path C: Discovery First
Best fit CMMC-focused DIB contractors RMF, FedRAMP, or DoD cloud operators Weak or stale asset records
Primary drivers 3.13.11, 3.4.1 (Rev 2); DFARS 252.204-7012 SC-12, SC-13, SC-17, CM-8 (Rev 5) CM-8; supply chain Flow-Down Requirements
Starting data System Security Plan, network diagrams Authorization packages, Customer Responsibility Matrix Scans, code review, supplier queries
Main risk Scope too narrow Documentation drift False positives and gaps
Speed to first usable result Fastest Moderate Slowest

These paths aren't mutually exclusive. Many teams start with Path A to produce a defensible CUI-scoped inventory, then run Path C discovery to test its completeness.

Whichever you choose, remember: every inventory entry needs an owner, a validation status, and a data sensitivity note. Without these, you have a list, not an inventory. Until you have a trusted inventory, PQC migration planning is guesswork. Start this work now by applying controls you're already assessed against, with a forward-looking lens.

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